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Abstract
A deep neural network (DNN) consists of a non-
linear transformation from an input to a feature
representation, followed by a common softmax
linear classifier. Though many efforts have been
devoted to designing a proper architecture for
nonlinear transformation, little investigation has
been done on the classifier part. In this paper, we
show that a properly designed classifier can im-
prove robustness to adversarial attacks and lead
to better prediction results. Specifically, we de-
fine a Max-Mahalanobis distribution (MMD) and
theoretically show that if the input distributes as
a MMD, the linear discriminant analysis (LDA)
classifier will have the best robustness to adver-
sarial examples. We further propose a novel Max-
Mahalanobis linear discriminant analysis (MM-
LDA) network, which explicitly maps a compli-
cated data distribution in the input space to a
MMD in the latent feature space and then applies
LDA to make predictions. Our results demon-
strate that the MM-LDA networks are signifi-
cantly more robust to adversarial attacks, and have
better performance in class-biased classification.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have shown state-of-the-art
performance in different tasks (Goodfellow et al., 2016). A
typical feed-forward DNN is a combination of a nonlinear
transformation from the input x to the latent feature vector z
and a linear classifier acting on z to return a prediction for x.
Many different architectures for neural networks have been
proposed, e.g., VGG nets (Simonyan & Zisserman, 2014),
Resnets (He et al., 2016a;b) and Google nets (Szegedy et al.,
2016) for powerful nonlinear transformation, while leaving
the linear classifier part under-explored, which is by default
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defined as a softmax regression (SR) (or logistic regression
(LR) for binary classification). Some work has tried to
instead use linear (or kernel) SVMs as the classifier (Huang
& LeCun, 2006; Ngiam et al., 2010; Coates et al., 2011;
Tang, 2013). But, such techniques either do not fine-tune the
lower level features w.r.t. the SVM’s objective or only result
in marginal improvements. Thus, SR is still the default
choice, given its simplicity and smoothness.
However, the SR (or LR) classifier is not problemless. Efron
(1975) shows that if the input x arises from a 2-center mix-
ture of Gaussian distribution, then LR is less efficient than
linear discriminant analysis (LDA), i.e., LR needs more
training samples than LDA does to obtain a certain error
rate. The relative efficiency of LR to LDA depends on the
Mahalanobis distance ∆ between the two Gaussian compo-
nents and the log-ratio of class priors ζ. Generally, a larger
value of ∆ or |ζ| will lead to a lower relative efficiency of
LR to LDA. Furthermore, it has been widely recognized
that the DNNs with a SR classifier are vulnerable to ad-
versarial attacks (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al.,
2015; Nguyen et al., 2015; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016),
where human imperceivable images can be crafted to fool
a high-accuracy network. Though many efforts have been
devoted to improving the robustness, such as using adversar-
ial training (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015;
Kurakin et al., 2017b), it still remains open on how to design
a robust classifier by itself.
In this paper, we draw inspirations from Efron’s analysis
and design a robust classifier that is generally applicable
to feedforward networks. Specifically, we define the Max-
Mahalanobis distribution (MMD) for multi-class classifi-
cation, which is a special mixture of Gaussian distribution.
We theoretically show that if the input samples distribute as
a MMD, the LDA classifier will have the best robustness to
adversarial attacks. Though distributing as a MMD is not
likely to hold for complex data (e.g., images in the pixel
space), it may be true if we properly transform the data.
Based on this result, we propose a novel Max-Mahalanobis
linear discriminant analysis (MM-LDA) network, which
explicitly learns a powerful nonlinear transformation net-
work to turn the complex inputs to match the MMD in a
latent feature space, and then uses the LDA principle to
make predictions on the latent features. Besides robustness,
since a large value of |ζ| for the data distribution indicates
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a high efficiency of LDA, the MM-LDA network can also
perform better on class-biased datasets,1 i.e., datasets with
different numbers of data points for different classes, which
are common in practice.
Unlike the SR classifier, whose parameters are jointly
learned with those of the transformation network, the op-
timal parameters of the MMD are estimated separately by
a simple procedure, and we only need to learn the param-
eters of the transformation network. The overall training
objective is a cross-entropy loss. Standard training algo-
rithms (e.g., stochastic gradient descent) are applicable with
little extra computational cost. Moreover, as the MM-LDA
network differs only in the classifier part, our technique
can be naturally combined with different kinds of nonlinear
transformation architectures (e.g., VGG nets, Resnets or
Google nets) and different kinds of training methods (Liu
et al., 2016; Pang et al., 2017) for good performance.
We test the proposed network on the widely used MNIST
and CIFAR-10 datasets for both robustness to adversarial
attacks and classification accuracy. As for robustness, we
consider various adversarial attacking methods, and the
results demonstrate that the MM-LDA network is indeed
much more robust to adversarial examples than the SR net-
works, even when the SR networks are enhanced by the
adversarial training methods. As for classification, we test
the performance of the MM-LDA network on both class-
biased and class-unbiased datasets. The results show that
the MM-LDA networks can obtain higher accuracy on class-
biased datasets while maintaining state-of-the-art accuracy
on class-unbiased datasets.
2. Preliminary Knowledge
In this section, we first briefly introduce some notations.
Then we provide a formal description of the adversarial
setting and introduce some common attacking methods. Fi-
nally, we introduce the relative efficiency of logistic re-
gression (LR) to linear discriminant analysis (LDA) in the
binary-class cases, which inspires our novel network.
2.1. Notations
We refer to the DNN with a softmax output layer as an SR
network, which is widely used in classification tasks (Good-
fellow et al., 2016). Let L denote the number of classes
(L ≥ 2), and define [L] = {1, · · · , L}. An SR network
can be generally expressed as F (x, θ) = S(Wsz + bs),
where z is the latent feature representation of the input x
and the softmax function S(z) : RL → RL is defined as
S(z)i = exp(zi)/
∑L
i=1 exp(zi) for each element i ∈ [L].
Here, θ denotes the parameters of the nonlinear transforma-
tion network from x to z. Ws and bs are the weight matrix
1Our setting differs from the previous work (Huang et al., 2017;
Fallah et al., 2017), where only the training set is class-biased.
and bias vector of the softmax layer respectively.
2.2. The Adversarial Setting
In the adversarial setting, adversaries apply attacking meth-
ods to craft adversarial examples based on the given normal
examples. We consider the white-box attack, which is the
most challenging and difficult threat model for classifiers to
defend (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b). White-box adversaries
know everything, e.g., parameters, about the classifiers that
they attack on. An adversarial example x∗ should be in-
distinguishable from its normal counterpart x by human
observers, but makes the classifier misclassify on it. For-
mally, the adversarial example x∗ crafted on x should satisfy
yˆ(x∗) 6= yˆ(x), s. t. ‖x∗ − x‖ ≤ , (1)
where yˆ(·) denotes the predicted label from the classifier,
and  is the maximal perturbation under a norm that varies
in different attacking methods. If there is an additional
constraint that yˆ(x∗) is a specific class l, x∗ is regarded as
targeted. Otherwise x∗ is untargeted. Let L(x, y) denote the
training loss on (x, y). Some of the most common attacking
methods are introduced below:
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) (Goodfellow et al.,
2015) is an one-step attacking method that the adversarial
example x∗ is crafted as x∗ = x+  · sign(∇xL(x, y)).
Basic Iterative Method (BIM) (Kurakin et al., 2017a) is
an iterative version of FGSM. Let x∗0 = x, r be the number
of iteration steps, then BIM crafts an adversarial example
as x∗i = clipx,(x
∗
i−1 +

r · sign(∇x∗i−1L(x∗i−1, y))), where
clipx,(·) is the clipping function.
Iterative Least-likely Class Method (ILCM) (Kurakin
et al., 2017a) is a targeted version of BIM with the formula
as x∗i = clipx,(x
∗
i−1− r ·sign(∇x∗i−1L(x∗i−1, yll))), where
yll = arg mini F (x)i is the label with minimal confidence.
Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) (Papernot
et al., 2016) is also a targeted attack that perturbs the feature
xi by a perturbation  in each iteration step that maximizes
the saliency map
S(x, y)[i] =
{
0, if ∂F (x)y∂xi < 0 or
∑
j 6=y
∂F (x)j
∂xi
> 0,
(
∂F (x)y
∂xi
)
∣∣∣∑j 6=y ∂F (x)j∂xi ∣∣∣ , otherwise.
JSMA perturbs fewer pixels compared to other attacks.
Carlini & Wagner (C&W) (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a) de-
fines x∗(ω) = 12 (tanh(ω) + 1) in terms of ω, and solves
minω ‖x∗(ω) − x‖22 + c · f(x∗(ω)), where c is a constant
chosen by a modified binary search. Let Spre(x) be the
input vector of the softmax function in a classifier, then f(·)
is the objective function defined as
f(x) = max(max{Spre(x)i : i 6= y} − Spre(x)i,−κ),
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where κ controls the confidence on adversarial examples.
The attacking methods are generally gradient-based. They
can be categorized into two groups. The first one consists
of iterative-based methods, e.g., FGSM, BIM, ILCM and
JSMA. These methods usually iterate less than hundreds of
rounds to craft an adversarial example. Besides, they often
blend the constraints into their updating operations (e.g.,
adding a sign function on the gradients under the L∞ norm
constraint). The second group consists of optimization-
based methods, e.g., the C&W method. These methods
require much more computation compared to the iterative-
based methods, since optimization-based methods iterate
thousands of rounds to craft an adversarial example. How-
ever, usually an optimization-based method has higher suc-
cess rates on attacking classifiers.
2.3. The Relative Efficiency of LR to LDA
Softmax regression (SR) is the most commonly used model
as the linear classifier part in neural networks (Goodfellow
et al., 2016). In the binary-class cases, SR reduces to LR.
We denote the two classes with labels 0 and 1, and make the
following assumption of the input x with its label y.
Assumption 1. The distribution of the p-dimensional ran-
dom vector x with its class label y is
P (y = i) = pii, P (x|y = i) = N (µi,Σ),
where i ∈ {0, 1}, pi0 + pi1 = 1 and each conditional Gaus-
sian distribution has the same covariance matrix Σ.
Efron (1975) shows that under Assumption 1, LR is asymp-
totically less efficient than LDA. Specifically, we denote the
decision regions of a classifier as R0 and R1, the error rate
of a classifier is defined as
ER = pi0P (x ∈ R1|x ∼ N (µ0,Σ))
+ pi1P (x ∈ R0|x ∼ N (µ1,Σ)).
Then the relative efficiency of LR to LDA is defined as
Effp(ζ,∆) = lim
N→∞
E[ERLDA−ERBayes]
E[ERLR−ERBayes] ,
where ERBayes is the Bayes error rate, N is the number of
training data points and ∆ = [(µ1−µ0)>Σ−1(µ1−µ0)] 12 is
the Mahalanobis distance between the two conditional Gaus-
sian components. A lower value of Effp(ζ,∆) indicates that
asymptotically LDA needs less training data points than LR
does to obtain a certain error rate.
In order to calculate Effp(ζ,∆), we let Ai be
Ai(pi0,∆) =
∫ ∞
−∞
e−∆
2/8xiϕ(x)
pi0e−∆x/2 + pi1e∆x/2
dx,
where ϕ(x) = (2pi)
1
2 exp(−x2/2) is the probability density
function of N (0, 1). Then there is:
Theorem 1. (Efron, 1975) The relative efficiency of logistic
regression to linear discriminant analysis is
Effp(ζ,∆) = (Q1 + (p− 1)Q2)/(Q3 + (p− 1)Q4),
where Q2 = 1 + pi0pi1∆2, Q4 = 1A0 and
Q1 =
(
1 ζ∆
) [ 1 + ∆24 (pi0 − pi1)∆2
(pi0 − pi1)∆2 1 + 2pi0pi1∆2
] [
1
ζ
∆
]
,
Q3 =
(
1 ζ∆
) 1
A0A2 −A21
[
A2 A1
A1 A0
] [
1
ζ
∆
]
.
Generally, larger values of |ζ| or ∆ imply lower values of
Effp(ζ,∆), and thus lower relative efficiency of LR to LDA.
3. Methodology
We now present our method in this section. We first define
the Max-Mahalanobis distribution (MMD) with theoretical
analyses, and then propose the Max-Mahalanobis linear
discriminant analysis (MM-LDA) network.
3.1. Max-Mahalanobis Distribution
We consider the multi-class cases, and a natural extension
of Assumption 1 is as follows.
Assumption 2. The distribution of the p-dimensional ran-
dom vector x with its class label y is
P (y = i) = pii, P (x|y = i) = N (µi,Σ),
where i ∈ [L],∑Li=1 pii = 1 and each conditional Gaussian
distribution has the same covariance matrix Σ.
Then, the Mahalanobis distance between any two Gaussian
components i and j is ∆i,j = [(µi − µj)>Σ−1(µi − µj)] 12 .
As suggested in Efron (1975), there is no loss of generality to
assume that Σ is nonsingular. Thus we can do the Cholesky
decomposition as Σ = QQ>, where Q is a lower triangular
matrix with positive diagonal entries. By applying the linear
transformation x˜ = Q−1(x − µ), where µ = ∑Li=1 µi/L,
we can reduce Assumption 2 to the standard form.
Assumption 3. The distribution of the p-dimensional ran-
dom vector x with its class label y is
P (y = i) = pii, P (x˜|y = i) = N (µ˜i, I),
where i ∈ [L],∑Li=1 pii = 1 and∑Li=1 µ˜i = 0.
For the standard form, we have ∆˜i,j = [(µ˜i − µ˜j)>(µ˜i −
µ˜j)]
1
2 . Note that the linear transformation x 7→ x˜ keeps the
Mahalanobis distances invariant, i.e., ∀i, j ∈ [L], there is
∆˜i,j = ∆i,j . In the sequel, we will assume that the input
pair (x, y) satisfies Assumption 3. For notation clarity, we
denote x˜ as x, µ˜i as µi, ∆˜i,j as ∆i,j without ambiguity.
Max-Mahalanobis Linear Discriminant Analysis Networks
This distribution is of interest as we can explicitly char-
acterize the robustness to adversarial samples of a LDA
classifier. Specifically, the decision boundary obtained by
LDA between class i and j is decided by the Fisher’s linear
discriminant function (Friedman et al., 2001), λi,j(x) =
βi,j + α
>
i,jx = 0, where
βi,j = log(pii/pij) +
1
2
(‖µj‖22 − ‖µi‖22),
α>i,j = (µi − µj)>.
In the adversarial setting, the nearest adversarial example x∗
that satisfies condition (1) w.r.t the normal example x must
be located on the decision boundary (Moosavi-Dezfooli
et al., 2016). We randomly sample a normal example
of class i as x(i), i.e., x(i) ∼ N (µi, I), and denote its
nearest adversarial counterpart on the decision boundary
λi,j(x) = 0 as x∗(i,j). According to condition (1), there is
yˆ(x(i)) = i, yˆ(x
∗
(i,j)) = j or yˆ(x(i)) = j, yˆ(x
∗
(i,j)) = i,
where yˆ(·) refers to the predicted label from the LDA classi-
fier. We define the distance between x(i) and x∗(i,j) as d(i,j).
Then we have the theorem on the relationship between the
expectation E[d(i,j)] and the Mahalanobis distance ∆i,j :
Theorem 2. (Proof in Appendix A) If pii = pij , the expecta-
tion of the distance d(i,j) is a function of the Mahalanobis
distance ∆i,j:
E[d(i,j)] =
√
2
pi
exp
(
−∆
2
i,j
8
)
+
1
2
∆i,j
[
1− 2Φ(−∆i,j
2
)
]
,
where Φ(·) is the normal cumulative distribution function.
The more general result when pii 6= pij can be found in
the proof of Theorem 2, which leads to similar conclusions.
Furthermore, we can show that E[d(i,j)] monotonically in-
creases w.r.t ∆i,j , as summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. The partial derivative of E[d(i,j)] w.r.t ∆i,j is
∂E[d(i,j)]
∂∆i,j
=
1
2
[1− 2Φ(−∆i,j
2
)] ≥ 0,
where the Mahalanobis distance ∆i,j is non-negative.
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2016) define the robustness of a
point x(i) as minj 6=i d(i,j). Similar to this definition, we
define the robustness of the classifier as below. Note that
E[d(i,j)] is the expectation value of the minimal distance
from a normal example to its potential adversarial counter-
part between class i and j. Thus E[d(i,j)] can measure the
local robustness of the classifier on the attacks focusing on
the two classes, where a larger value of E[d(i,j)] indicates
better local robustness, and vice verse. Then the robustness
of the classifier on all the attacks can be measured by
RB = min
i,j∈[L]
E[d(i,j)], (2)
Algorithm 1 GenerateOptMeans
Input: The constant C, the dimension of vectors p and
the number of classes L. (L ≤ p+ 1)
Initialization: Let the L mean vectors be µ∗1 = e1 and
µ∗i = 0p, i 6= 1. Here e1 and 0p separately denote the
first unit basis vector and the zero vector in Rp.
for i = 2 to L do
for j = 1 to i− 1 do
µ∗i (j) = −[1 + 〈µ∗i , µ∗j 〉 · (L−1)]/[µ∗j (j) · (L−1)]
end for
µ∗i (i) =
√
1− ‖µ∗i ‖22
end for
for k = 1 to L do
µ∗k =
√
C · µ∗k
end for
Return: The optimal mean vectors µ∗i , i ∈ [L].
which can be regarded as a tight lower bound of the lo-
cal robustness between any two classes. Because E[d(i,j)]
monotonically increases w.r.t ∆i,j , we prefer larger values
of ∆i,j for better local robustness. According to Corollary 1,
the gap
∣∣E[d(i,j)]/∆i,j − 1/2∣∣ monotonically decreases to
0 w.r.t ∆i,j , e.g., when ∆i,j > 10, we can numerically fig-
ure out that
∣∣E[d(i,j)]/∆i,j − 1/2∣∣ < 10−7. Thus we can
approximate E[d(i,j)] using ∆i,j/2, which further results in
an approximation for the robustness RB as
RB ≈ RB = min
i,j∈[L]
∆i,j/2. (3)
We now investigate when the approximated robustness RB
of the LDA classifier can achieve its maximal value, and
derive an efficient algorithm to estimate the unknown means
µ = {µi|i ∈ [L]} of the input distribution. Let ‖µ‖2 be
maxi ‖µi‖2. Since µ has finite elements, there always exists
a positive constant C, such that ‖µ‖22 = C. The following
theorem gives a tight upper bound for RB.
Theorem 3. (Proof in Appendix A) Assume that
∑L
i=1 µi =
0 and ‖µ‖22 = C. Then we have
RB ≤
√
LC
2(L− 1) .
The equality holds if and only if
µ>i µj =
{
C, i = j,
C/(1− L), i 6= j, (4)
where i, j ∈ [L] and µi, µj ∈ µ.
We denote any set of means that satisfy the optimal con-
dition (4) as µ∗. When L ≤ p + 1,2 there is an infinite
2Otherwise, there is no solution for µ∗.
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number of µ∗ because of the degeneracy of the condition.
Intuitively, the elements in µ∗ constitute the vertexes of an
equilateral triangle when L = 3, and those of a regular
tetrahedron when L = 4. In Alg. 1, we propose an easy-to-
implement method to construct a set of means µ∗0 that satisfy
the condition, where µ∗0 = GenerateOptMeans(C, p, L).
With the above results, we formally define a joint distribu-
tion with the form
P (y = i) = pii, P (x|y = i) = N (µ∗i , I), i ∈ [L]
as a Max-Mahalanobis distribution (MMD), namely, it has
the maximal minimal Mahalanobis distance between any
two Gaussian components for a given ‖µ‖2. In a nutshell,
when regarding the set of means µ in Assumption 3 as inde-
pendent variables for a given ‖µ‖2, the LDA classifier would
have the best robustness if its input distributes as a MMD.
We refer to the above process as the Max-Mahalanobis lin-
ear discriminant analysis (MM-LDA) procedure.
3.2. The MM-LDA Network
Though elegant, the MM-LDA procedure is not directly
applicable in practice, as the mixture of Gaussian Assump-
tion 3 is unlikely to hold in the input space (e.g., images in
the pixel space), in which the data distribution P (x) can be
very complex. Fortunately, thanks to the universal approxi-
mation power of neural networks (Hornik et al., 1989) and
the algorithmic advances, previous work on deep genera-
tive models (Goodfellow et al., 2014; Kingma & Welling,
2013) has demonstrated that a deep neural network can be
learned to transform a simple distribution (e.g., standard
normal) to a complex one that matches the data distribution.
The reverse direction is also true, and it has been implicitly
applied in feed-forward networks, where a powerful nonlin-
ear transformation network is learned to turn a complexly
distributed input data into a latent feature space, and then
a linear classifier (e.g., SR) is sufficient to achieve state-
of-the-art performance (Simonyan & Zisserman, 2014; He
et al., 2016a;b; Szegedy et al., 2016). Therefore, we can
expect that the MM-LDA procedure will work well on a
properly learned latent feature space by exploring the power
for DNNs, as detailed below.
Formally, we propose the Max-Mahalanobis linear discrim-
inant analysis (MM-LDA) network, which consists of a
nonlinear transformation network (characterized as a DNN)
to turn the input x into a latent feature representation z,
and applies the MM-LDA procedure on z. Namely, the
MM-LDA network explicitly models P (z) as a MMD, and
applies LDA on z to make predictions. According to the
analysis in Section 3.1, the MM-LDA network can have
the best robustness in the latent feature space, and further
results in better robustness in the input space.
Given a feature vector z in the MM-LDA network, accord-
Algorithm 2 The training phase for the MM-LDA network
Input: The model zθ(x), the square norm C of Gaussian
means, the training dataset D = {(xi, yi)}i∈[N ].
Initialization: Initialize θ as θ0, the training step as s =
0. Let p = dim(z), ε be the learning rate variable.
Get µ∗ = GenerateOptMeans(C, p, L) for the MMD.
while not converged do
Sample a mini-batch of training data Dm from D,
Calculate the objective
LmMM =
1
|Dm|
∑
(xi,yi)∈Dm
LMM(xi, yi, µ∗),
Update parameters θs+1 ← θs − ε∇θLmMM,
Set s← s+ 1.
end while
Return: The parameters θMM = θs.
ing to Bayes’ theorem and the definition of MMD, we have
the conditional distribution of labels:
P (y=k|z) = P (z|y=k)P (y=k)
P (z)
=
pikN (z|µ∗k, I)∑L
i=1 piiN (z|µ∗i , I)
.
Note that the feature vector z is actually zθ(x), since it is
obtained by the nonlinear transformation network x 7→ z,
parameterized by θ. Instead of estimating model parameters
from data as LDA does, MM-LDA treats the set of means
µ∗ and different class priors pii, i ∈ [L] as hyperparameters,
and θ is what the MM-LDA network needs to learn in the
training phase. Similar to the SR network, we let FMM(x)
be the output prediction of the MM-LDA network. The k-th
element of the prediction is
FMM(x)k = P (y = k|zθ(x)), (5)
where k ∈ [L]. In the training phase, the loss function3 for
the MM-LDA network is LMM(x, y) = −1>y logFMM(x),
which is the cross-entropy between the one-hot true label
1y and the prediction FMM(x). By minimizing the loss
function w.r.t θ on the training set D := {(xi, yi)}i∈[N ],
we can obtain the optimal parameters θMM for the MM-
LDA network as θMM = arg minθ
1
N
∑N
i=1 LMM(xi, yi).
In Alg. 2 we demonstrate the complete training phase. In
the test phase, the MM-LDA network returns the predicted
label yˆMM = arg maxk FMM(x)k, where the set of means
µ∗ is the same as the one used in training.
Fig. 1 provides an intuitive comparison between MM-LDA
networks and SR networks (See Sec. 4.2 for details). For SR
networks, though the latent features are discriminative, the
distribution is not as orderly as that for MM-LDA networks.
3More discussion on the training loss function for the MM-
LDA network can be found in Appendix B.1
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Figure 1. t-SNE visualization of the latent features on CIFAR-10.
The index numbers indicate classes 0 to 9, where each number
locates on the median position of the corresponding vectors.
This is because SR networks do not explicitly model the
distribution of z, while MM-LDA does model it as a well-
structured MMD. This structure can influence the nonlinear
transformation network via back-propagation as in Alg. 2.
In addition to better robustness in the adversarial setting,
the MM-LDA network should also perform better than the
SR network on the input with a class-biased distribution,
i.e., a distribution with different class priors. This can be
intuitively illustrated by the conclusions in Section 2.3 that
a larger value of |ζ| implies lower relative efficiency of
LR to LDA. Since ζ denotes the log-ratio of class-priors, a
larger value of |ζ| indicates more biased class priors, i.e.,
bigger gaps among class priors. Thus in the multi-class
cases, acting on the input with biased class priors should
intuitively result in low relative efficiency of SR to LDA,
and further to MM-LDA.
4. Experiments
We now experimentally demonstrate that the MM-LDA net-
works are more robust in the adversarial setting while main-
taining state-of-the-art performance on normal examples,
and have better performance on class-biased datasets.
4.1. Setup
We choose the widely used MNIST (LeCun et al., 1998) and
CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky & Hinton, 2009) datasets. MNIST
consists of grey images of handwritten digits in classes 0 to
9, and CIFAR-10 consists of color images in 10 different
classes. Each dataset has 60,000 images, of which 50,000
are in the training set and the rest are in the test set. The
pixel values of images in both sets are scaled to the interval
[−0.5, 0.5] before fed into classifiers. The baseline is the
most common SR network (Goodfellow et al., 2016). The
empirical class prior pˆik of a dataset with N samples is
pik = Nk/N , where Nk is the number of samples in class
k. Then a dataset is class-unbiased if ∀k ∈ [L], pˆik = 1/L
for both training and testing sets; otherwise class-biased.
4.2. Performance on Normal Examples
We first test the performance on normal examples (i.e., the
samples in the original datasets without any perturbations).
We implement Resnet-32 (He et al., 2016a) on MNIST and
CIFAR-10, which uses the SR model as the linear classifier.
This network will be denoted by Resnet-32 (SR). Our MM-
LDA network shares the same architecture of nonlinear
transformation as Resnet-32 (SR) while uses the MM-LDA
procedure for classification, and we denote it by Resnet-
32 (MM-LDA). The number of training steps is 20,000
on MNIST and 90,000 on CIFAR-10 for both networks.
Here we apply the training setting introduced in He et al.
(2016b) to train the Resnet-32 (SR). To train the Resnet-
32 (MM-LDA), we simply use the same training setting
as the Resnet-32 (SR), except that we apply the adaptive
optimization method—Adam (Kingma & Ba, 2015) rather
than the momentum SGD used in He et al. (2016b), to avoid
extra effort on tuning training hyperparameters.4
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Figure 2. Validation error rates
(%) of the MM-LDA net-
works w.r.t different values of
log10(C) on CIFAR-10.
When applying the MM-
LDA network, the only hy-
perparameter is the square
norm C of the Gaussian
means in MMD. If C is
too small, the conditional
Gaussian components in
MMD will largely over-
lap to each other, which
makes the optimal Bayes
error rate be high, and fur-
ther results in a high error
rate for the LDA classifier. Besides, if C is too large, the
magnitudes of the transformation parameters θ will also tend
to sharply increase during the training procedure, which
makes the MM-LDA network easy to overfit. In our ex-
periments, we empirically choose the value of C by doing
5-fold cross-validation on the training set. Fig. 2 shows
the validation error rates of the MM-LDA networks w.r.t
log10(C) on CIFAR-10. We find that when log10(C) = 2,
i.e., C = 100 the MM-LDA network has the lowest average
validation error rate with a small value of standard deviation.
Thus hereafter we will set C = 100.
Table 2 shows the classification error rates on the test sets of
both datasets. We can see that the MM-LDA network main-
tains state-of-the-art performance on normal examples. Fur-
thermore, in Fig. 1 we apply the t-SNE technique (Maaten
& Hinton, 2008) to visualize the latent feature vectors on
1,000 randomly sampled test images of CIFAR-10. We can
find that the trained MM-LDA network maps the data distri-
bution in the input space to a much more regular distribution
in the latent feature space, as stated before. Note that class
3 and class 5 are close to each other in Fig. 1b, which is
reasonable since they are separately ’cat’ and ‘dog’, even a
human observer will sometimes misidentify them.
4We also try to substitute Adam for the momentum SGD in the
training phase of Resnet-32 (SR), and we found that the momentum
SGD makes Resnet-32 (SR) have lower error rates on both datasets.
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Table 1. Classification accuracy (%) on adversarial examples of MNIST and CIFAR-10. The investigated values of perturbation are 0.04,
0.12, and 0.20. Boldface indicates the best result under certain combination of a value of perturbation and an attacking method.
Perturbation Model MNIST CIFAR-10FGSM BIM ILCM JSMA FGSM BIM ILCM JSMA
0.04
Resnet-32 (SR) 93.6 87.9 94.8 92.9 20.0 5.5 0.2 65.6
Resnet-32 (SR) + SAT 86.7 68.5 98.4 - 24.4 7.0 0.4 -
Resnet-32 (SR) + HAT 88.7 96.3 99.8 - 30.3 5.3 1.3 -
Resnet-32 (MM-LDA) 99.2 99.2 99.0 99.1 91.3 91.2 70.0 91.2
0.12
Resnet-32 (SR) 28.1 3.4 20.9 56.0 10.2 4.1 0.3 20.5
Resnet-32 (SR) + SAT 40.5 8.7 88.8 - 88.2 6.9 0.1 -
Resnet-32 (SR) + HAT 40.3 40.1 92.6 - 44.1 8.7 0.0 -
Resnet-32 (MM-LDA) 99.3 98.6 99.6 99.7 90.7 90.1 42.5 91.1
0.20
Resnet-32 (SR) 15.5 0.3 1.7 25.6 10.7 4.2 0.6 11.5
Resnet-32 (SR) + SAT 17.3 1.1 69.4 - 91.7 9.4 0.0 -
Resnet-32 (SR) + HAT 10.1 10.5 46.1 - 40.7 6.0 0.2 -
Resnet-32 (MM-LDA) 97.5 97.3 96.6 99.6 89.5 89.7 31.2 91.8
Table 2. Error rates (%) on the test sets of MNIST and CIFAR-10.
Model MNIST CIFAR-10
Resnet-32 (SR) 0.38 7.13
Resnet-32 (MM-LDA) 0.35 8.04
4.3. Performance in the Adversarial Setting
Now we test the robustness of MM-LDA networks in the
adversarial setting. Adversarial training is one of the most
common and effective methods to improve the robustness of
classifiers on iterative-based attacks (Szegedy et al., 2014;
Goodfellow et al., 2015; Kurakin et al., 2017b; Tramèr et al.,
2017). Thus in addition to the SR networks trained on
normal examples, we also treat the SR networks enhanced
by adversarial training as stronger baselines. We construct
the enhanced baselines by first crafting adversarial examples
on the trained SR networks, then fine-tuning the networks on
the mixture of the normal examples and crafted adversarial
examples. More technical details are in Appendix B.2.
For more complete analysis, we apply two kinds of adversar-
ial training methods to enhance baselines. They differ in the
choices of adversarial examples to fine-tune the classifiers:
Specific Adversarial Training (SAT) fine-tunes the classi-
fiers on the adversarial examples crafted by the same attack
with the same value of perturbation  as that when attacking
the classifiers. Similar strategy is used in (Szegedy et al.,
2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015).
Hybrid Adversarial Training (HAT) fine-tunes the classi-
fiers on the adversarial examples crafted by the same attack
as that when attacking the classifiers, but with various values
of . Specifically, we uniformly choose  from the interval
[0.02, 0.20] when crafting adversarial examples for HAT.
Similar strategy is used in (Kurakin et al., 2017b).
Table 1 presents the classification accuracy of the networks
on the adversarial examples crafted by iterative-based at-
tacks. We investigate on three different values of perturba-
tion : 0.04, 0.12 and 0.20 (See Section 2.2 for ). Usually
an adversarial noise with perturbation larger than 0.05 is
perceivable by human eyes. From the results, we can see
Table 3. Average minimal distortions of the adversarial examples
crafted by the C&W attack on MNIST and CIFAR-10.
Model MNIST CIFAR-10
Resnet-32 (SR) 8.56 0.67
Resnet-32 (MM-LDA) 16.32 2.80
that both SAT and HAT can effectively enhance the original
baselines to stronger ones. However, the adversarial training
methods require extra computational cost and are less effec-
tive on multi-step methods, e.g., BIM and ILCM (Kurakin
et al., 2017b). By contrast, the MM-LDA network signif-
icantly improves the robustness on iterative-based attacks
compared to almost all the baselines. This is because in the
MM-LDA networks, normal examples distribute as a MMD
in the latent feature space, which makes it more difficult
for adversaries to move a normal example from its original
class to other classes. Note that we do not adversarially
fine-tune Resnet-32 (SR) on the JSMA attack, since it is
computationally expensive to craft an adversarial example
by JSMA, which makes adversarial training inefficient.
We also apply the optimization-based C&W attack on the
trained networks. Since there is yet no method including
adversarial training to effectively defend the C&W attack un-
der the white-box threat model (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a;b),
we only compare between Resnet-32 (SR) and Resnet-32
(MM-LDA). In the C&W attack, we set the binary search
steps for the constant c be 9, and the maximal number of
iteration steps for each value of c be 10,000. This setting
is strong enough, so that the crafted adversarial examples
can evade both the SR and MM-LDA networks with nearly
100% success rate. As shown in Table 3, the average min-
imal distortions of adversarial examples on the MM-LDA
networks are much larger than those on the SR networks.
Here the distortion is defined in Szegedy et al. (2014), where
the pixel values of images are in the interval [0, 255] when
calculating it. This results mean that the C&W attack has to
add much larger noises to successfully evade the MM-LDA
networks, as theoretically demonstrated in Sec. 3.1.
Furthermore, we find that when applying the C&W attack
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Figure 3. Some normal examples with the semantic adversarial noises crafted by the C&W attack on MNIST and CIFAR-10. The shown
noises crafted for the MM-LDA networks are much more semantic, while similar meaningful noises are hardly observed in those crafted
for the SR networks. However, most of the adversarial noises crafted for the MM-LDA networks still seem like random noises.
on the MM-LDA networks, some of the adversarial noises
have the same semantic meanings as their corresponding
normal examples (around 1% ∼ 5% of all noises), while
similar phenomenon can hardly be observed when attacking
on the SR networks (less than 0.1% of all noise). We show
some of the semantic noises in Fig. 3. The adversarial noise
is calculated as (x∗ − x)/2 to keep the pixel values of the
noise in the interval [−0.5, 0.5]. This result indicates that
MM-LDA networks can learn more robust features, such
that on the shown normal examples, the optimal attacking
strategy that the C&W attack finds for MM-LDA networks
is to weaken the features of the normal examples as a whole,
rather than adding meaningless noise as for the SR networks.
4.4. Performance on Class-biased Datasets
Finally, we evaluate on class-biased datasets, which are
more realistic though many sets were artificially constructed
as class-unbiased, e.g., CIFAR-10. We construct the class-
biased datasets by randomly sampling each data point of
class i from CIFAR-10 with probability αi, i ∈ L, where
L = 10 for CIFAR-10. Specifically, let α = (α0, · · · , α9),
D be the training or test set of CIFAR-10, then the con-
structed class-biased dataset is Dbiasα that ∀(x, y) ∈ D,
P ((x, y) ∈ Dbiasα ) = αy. Then the empirical class pri-
ors of Dbiasα have expectations as E[pˆik] = αk/‖α‖1. We
choose two typical kinds of bias probability α as below:
Bias Probability 1 (BP1) has α = (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, · · · , 1.0).
To avoid the system error caused by certain permutation of
the elements in α, we randomly rearrange the elements in
α to get 10 counterparts α(0), · · ·α(9). The publicly avail-
able datasets with similar class-prior distributions as BP1
including the IMDB-WIKI dataset (Rothe et al., 2015) for
age and gender prediction, and the KITTI dataset (Geiger
et al., 2012) for autonomous driving.
Bias Probability 2 (BP2) has α = (0.2, · · · , 0.2, 1.0).
Since there is only one element in α that equals to 1.0 and
the others all equal to 0.2, we assign 1.0 in turn to 10 differ-
ent classes to avoid the system error, and similarly get 10
counterparts α(0), · · · , α(9). The Caltech101 dataset (Fei-
Fei et al., 2007) and the large-scale ImageNet dataset (Deng
et al., 2009) have similar class-prior distributions as BP2.
We separately apply the counterparts of BP1 and BP2 on
both the training and test sets of CIFAR-10 to construct
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Figure 4. Classification accuracy on the test sets of class-biased
datasets. Each index of dataset corresponds to a counterpart of the
bias probability. The original class-unbiased dataset is CIFAR-10.
totally 20 class-biased datasets, i.e., both the training and
test sets of each constructed dataset are class-biased. Then
we train Resnet-32 (SR) and Resnet-32 (MM-LDA) on each
class-biased dataset. Fig. 4 shows the test accuracy of the
trained networks on the 20 class-biased datasets. Note that
when training and testing the MM-LDA networks, we set
the class priors as uniform pik = 1/L to calculate the pre-
diction FMM(x) rather than setting pik = αk/‖α‖1. By
doing this we give a fair comparison between the SR and
the MM-LDA networks, since SR is a discriminant model
that cannot exploit the information of class priors. We can
see that the MM-LDA networks still perform better than
the SR networks on almost all the datasets constructed by
the counterparts of BP1 and BP2. This result indicates that
the better performance of the MM-LDA networks on class-
biased datasets comes from the intrinsic superiority of the
MM-LDA networks, not from the extra knowledge on class
priors. We also try to set pik = αk/‖α‖1, and find that
the difference of FMM(x) between the two settings is small,
which most likely leads to the same predicted label. This
is because when the class priors are not too biased, i.e., the
value of maxi,j∈[L] |log(pii/pij)| is not too large, the expo-
nential terms in Eq. (5) will dominate the calculation of
FMM(x) since we choose a relatively large C = 100.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we propose the novel MM-LDA network. The
MM-LDA network is much more robust in the adversarial
setting with theoretical guarantees, while maintaining state-
of-the-art performance on normal examples. The MM-LDA
network also performs better on class-biased datasets. Our
network is easy to implement and can be naturally combined
with different nonlinear transformation architectures and
training methods designed for the SR network.
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A. Proof
Theorem 1. The relative efficiency of logistic regression to
linear discriminant analysis is
Effp(ζ,∆) = (Q1 + (p− 1)Q2)/(Q3 + (p− 1)Q4),
where Q2 = 1 + pi0pi1∆2, Q4 = 1A0 and
Q1 =
(
1 ζ∆
) [ 1 + ∆24 (pi0 − pi1)∆2
(pi0 − pi1)∆2 1 + 2pi0pi1∆2
] [
1
ζ
∆
]
,
Q3 =
(
1 ζ∆
) 1
A0A2 −A21
[
A2 A1
A1 A0
] [
1
ζ
∆
]
.
Proof. The proof can be found in Efron (1975).
Theorem 2. If pii = pij , the expectation of the distance
d(i,j) is a function of the Mahalanobis distance ∆i,j:
E[d(i,j)] =
√
2
pi
exp
(
−∆
2
i,j
8
)
+
1
2
∆i,j
[
1− 2Φ(−∆i,j
2
)
]
,
where Φ(·) is the normal cumulative distribution function.
Proof. Since d(i,j) is the distance of x(i) to the decision
boundary between class i and j decided by the Fisher’s
linear discriminant function λi,j(x) = βi,j + α>i,jx = 0,
where
βi,j = log(pii/pij) +
1
2
(‖µj‖22 − ‖µi‖22),
α>i,j = (µi − µj)>.
We have
d(i,j) =
∣∣βi,j + α>i,jx(i)∣∣
‖αi,j‖2 =
∣∣βi,j + α>i,jx(i)∣∣
∆i,j
.
Because x(i) is sampled from the conditional Gaussian dis-
tribution of class i, there is
x(i) ∼ N (µi, I).
Let Hi,j = βi,j + α>i,jx(i), and ζi,j = log(pii/pij), then
according to the property of Gaussian distribution we can
know that
Hi,j ∼ N (µ′i,j , σ2i,j),
where
µ′i,j = βi,j + α
>
i,jµi
= ζi,j +
1
2
(‖µj‖22 − ‖µi‖22) + (µi − µj)>µi
= ζi,j +
1
2
‖µi − µj‖22
= ζi,j +
1
2
∆2i,j ,
and σ2i,j = α
>
i,jIαi,j = ∆
2
i,j . Thus |Hi,j | distributes as a
Folded Gaussian (Normal) Distribution. From the property
of folded Gaussian distribution we know that
E[|Hi,j |] =
√
2
pi
σi,j exp(−
µ′i,j
2
2σi,j2
)+µ′i,j [1−2Φ(−
µ′i,j
σi,j
)].
For notation clarity, we let
αi,j =
µ′i,j
σi,j
=
1
2
∆i,j + ζi,j/∆i,j .
Since E[d(i,j)] = E[|Hi,j |]/∆i,j , we have
E[d(i,j)] =
√
2
pi
exp(−α
2
i,j
2
) + αi,j [1− 2Φ(−αi,j)].
The derivative of E[d(i,j)] to ∆i,j is
∂E[d(i,j)]
∂∆i,j
=
∂E[d(i,j)]
∂αi,j
· ∂αi,j
∂∆i,j
= [1− 2Φ(−1
2
∆i,j − ζi,j
∆i,j
)](
1
2
− ζi,j
∆2i,j
)
= [1− 2Φ(−∆i,j(1
2
− ζi,j
∆2i,j
))](
1
2
− ζi,j
∆2i,j
)
≥ 0,
where the Mahalanobis distance ∆i,j is non-negative. Spe-
cially, when pii = pij , i.e., ζi,j = 0, there is
E[d(i,j)] =
√
2
pi
exp(−∆
2
i,j
8
) +
1
2
∆i,j [1− 2Φ(−∆i,j
2
)].
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Theorem 3. Assume that
∑L
i=1 µi = 0 and ‖µ‖22 = C.
Then there has
RB ≤
√
LC
2(L− 1) .
The equality holds if and only if
µ>i µj =
{
C, i = j,
C/(1− L), i 6= j,
where i, j ∈ [L] and µi, µj ∈ µ.
Proof. According to the definition of RB, we have
RB =
1
2
min
i,j∈[L]
∆i,j
=
1
2
√
min
i,j∈[L]
∆2i,j
≤ 1
2
√
1
L(L− 1)
∑
i 6=j
∆2i,j
=
1
2
√
1
L(L− 1)
∑
i 6=j
(‖µi‖22 + ‖µj‖22 − 2µ>i µj)
=
1
2
√√√√ 2
L
∑
i∈[L]
‖µi‖22 −
1
L(L− 1)
∑
i6=j
2µ>i µj
=
1
2
√√√√ 2
L− 1
∑
i∈[L]
‖µi‖22 −
1
L(L− 1)(
∑
i∈[L]
µi)2,
Since
∑L
i=1 µi = 0 and ‖µ‖22 = C, we further have
RB ≤
√√√√ 1
2(L− 1)
∑
i∈[L]
‖µi‖22
≤
√
LC
2(L− 1) .
Note that the final equality holds if and only if all the equal-
ities hold, i.e., there are
‖µi‖22 = C,∀i ∈ [L],
and
∆i,j = constant,∀i 6= j.
Thus we can easily derive that the final equality holds if and
only if
µ>i µj =
{
C, i = j,
C/(1− L), i 6= j,
where i, j ∈ [L] and µi, µj ∈ µ.
B. More Discussions and Details
In this section we discuss more on the loss function of the
MM-LDA network, and the choice of the square norm of
C of MMD. Besides, we provide technical details of the
adversarial training methods we use in our experiments.
B.1. The Loss Function of the MM-LDA Network
Considering that the network with parameters θ induces
a joint distribution on the latent feature z and the label y
as Qθ(z, y). We denote the MMD as P (z, y), H(P,Q) as
the cross-entropy for the distributions P and Q. Then the
training objective could be designed as
H(Qθ, P ) = E(z,y)∼Qθ [− logP (y|z)− logP (z)]
= E(z,y)∼Qθ [− logP (y|z)] + Ez∼Q′θ [− logP (z)].
Here Q
′
θ is the marginal distribution of Qθ for z. Since we
are focusing on classification tasks, we assume for tractabil-
ity that the marginal distribution Q
′
θ(z) is consistent with it
of the MMD, i.e., P (z). Therefore, minimizing H(Qθ, P )
equals to minimizing E(z,y)∼Qθ [− logP (y|z)], which fur-
ther leads to the loss function LMM under the Monte Carlo
approximation. In practice, the gap between Q
′
θ(z) and
P (z) would not influence the performance, as shown in our
experiment results.
In order to better gather the latent feature vectors to their
corresponding conditional Gaussian distributions, the loss
function of the MM-LDA network should be
LMM = −FMM(µ∗y)> logFMM(x),
where FMM(µ∗y)k = P (y = k|z = µ∗y), k ∈ [L]. FMM(µ∗y)
is the prediction vector on the mean vector µ∗y in MMD. We
further have
Max-Mahalanobis Linear Discriminant Analysis Networks
FMM(µ
∗
y)y =
exp(2µ∗y
>µ∗y)∑
i∈[L] exp(2µ∗y
>µ∗i )
=
1
1 +
∑
i 6=y exp[2µ∗y
>(µ∗i − µ∗y)]
=
1
1 + (L− 1) exp(− 2LCL−1 )
.
Thus the L∞-distance between the one-hot label vector 1y
and FMM(µ∗y) is
‖1y − FMM(µ∗y)‖∞ ≤
∣∣1− FMM(µ∗y)y∣∣
=
1
1 + 1L−1 exp(
2LC
L−1 )
.
It is easy to see that the gap between 1y and FMM(µ∗y)
rapidly decreases w.r.t C. For instance, when C > 10,
L = 10, we numerically have ‖1y − FMM(µ∗y)‖∞ ≤ 10−8.
Therefore we use the one-hot label 1y in the loss function
because of its simplicity.
B.2. Technical Details of Adversarial Training
Our experiments are done on NVIDIA Tesla P100 GPUs.
The number of the adversarial fine-tuning steps on MNIST
is 10,000 and on CIFAR-10 is 30,000. We apply a constant
learning rate of 0.01 on both datasets. The mixing ratio of
normal examples and adversarial examples is 1:1. Averagely
the time cost to craft an adversarial example using FGSM,
BIM and ILCM is less than 0.1 seconds, while using JSMA
is around 5 seconds. This makes adversarial training on
JSMA computationally expensive.
